On 27 August 1991, the European Community decided to establish a peace conference on Yugoslavia and an Arbitration Committee comprising five Presidents from among the various Constitutional Courts of the EC countries. The Committee became known as the Badinter Committee named after its president Mr. Badinter -President of the French Constitutional Court. Its mandate was to give binding decisions as to the process of dissolution of the SFRY.
In the meantime, Croatia made another appeal to the Member States of the EC and the UN 'to establish diplomatic relations with the Republic of Croatia'. 8 At the same time, it decided 'to recognize the independence and sovereignty of the other republics of the former SFRY on the basis of the principle of mutuality.' Recent undertakings between Belgrade and Zagreb aiming at a mutual recognition show that, up to now, this has been a mere intention without any practical consequences.
On 16 December 1991 the EC Foreign Ministers issued a 'Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of the New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union' 9 and a 'Declaration on Yugoslavia'. 10 They had acknowledged that they could no longer deny the' political realities and that they had to react correspondingly.
It is interesting to note that, in the Guidelines, the recognition of the new States was not only made subject to the traditional criteria for the recognition of statehood (which are: permanent population, defined territory, a government in effective control of the territory and the capacity to enter into relations with other States), 1 ' but also made dependent upon 'the political realities in each case'. This made recognition a matter of political discretion whereas the traditional criteria only took account of the mere facts, exactly mirroring the current situation.
The development of recognition, from a simple declaration of an ascertainable fact into a tool for political actions, is also underlined by the statement that the Member States 'would take account of the effects of recognition on neighbouring States'. Consequently, recognition no longer remains only an issue between the two States in question, but entails a 'third dimension' in so far as neighbouring States are to be taken into account. Furthermore, it was stated that 'the Community and its Member States will not recognize entities which are the result of aggression.' This can be applied to the Serbian entities in Croatia and we will see in a moment the effects of this attitude.
Following the Guidelines, the Declaration on Yugoslavia made recognition of the Yugoslav Republics subject to various conditions, among them their application to be recognized. Having fulfilled the requirements, on 15 January 1992, Croatia was recognized by the EC and subsequently by many other countries. The whole recognition process ended with Croatia being admitted to the UN on 22 May 1992.
The current status of Croatia under public international law can be drawn from the Opinions (in particular Opinion Nos. 2, 3 and 5) spelled out by the Badinter Committee. These opinions were the basis for the Committee's decision to recognize Croatia. Applying the principle of uti possidetis, Opinion No. 3 held that when the former republic Croatia was in the process of becoming a sovereign State, the former internal boundaries between Croatia and Serbia became frontiers between two sovereign States. However, this principle could not be applied to the new Serbian entities in Croatia, although they, too, had declared their independence (the so-called 'Republika Srpska Krajina'). These boundaries were the result of the use of force and therefore were 'not capable of producing any legal effect.' 12 Although the Serbian population in Croatia did not constitute a sovereign State they were, however, still afforded the rights accorded to minorities under public international law, including the right to choose their own nationality.
B. Serbia and Montenegro
The determining issue in the question of recognition of Serbia and Montenegro has been the dispute as to whether the former Yugoslavia was in a process of secession or dissolution. Whereas Zagreb's view has been that this was a legitimate process of self-determination leading to the dissolution of the original State, Belgrade has assumed a process of secession, with Serbia and Montenegro being the 'continuing State' of the former Yugoslavia. The question behind the dispute is whether the SFRY's assets should be divided equitably between the successor States or whether the 'continuing State' is entitled to them.
Serbia expressed its view as early as in 1991 with a statement by Serbia's Foreign Minister that Serbia 'is not interested in secession'. 13 It is very questionable, however, whether the interests of a State have any influence on determining the process which the SFRY went through. Of course, it was in the other republics' interest, too, to be recognized as sovereign States, but recognition was not due to this self-interest, but, instead, the requirements under public international law and the ones laid down by the EC (see above). Moreover, Serbia has not been interested in being recognized as a new State, because it fears that this would prejudice the decision as to whether it was a 'continuing State' of the former Yugoslavia with the other republics seceding from the 'core-land'. It therefore did not apply for recognition at all.
On 27 April 1992, the Assembly of the so-called 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)' promulgated the Constitution of the FRY, claiming that the SFRY 'is transformed' into the FRY, a State comprising two constituent republics, Serbia and Montenegro.
14 They stated that they strictly respected the continuity of the international personality and that they undertook to fulfill all the rights conferred to and the obligations assumed by the SFRY in international relations, including its membership in all international organisations and participation in international treaties ratified or acceded to by Yugoslavia. 
III. Mutual Recognition

A. New Aspects
Having examined the international recognition of the republics in question, I will now turn to the question of which new aspects the envisaged mutual recognition entails.
First, recognition is now even more important for the establishment of peace in the area. This does not mean that international recognition is irrelevant, especially as it has now become a tool for political action (see above). Although international recognition does not directly concern the relations between the republics themselves, it 'would take account of the effects of recognition on neighbouring States'. 18 Mutual recognition, however, has direct effects on relations between the recognizing States: apart from being simply a 'congratulatory message on attainment of independence' 19 or a formal determination of statehood, it leads to the establishment of diplomatic relations often connected with the conclusion of economic treaties. This means that the exchange of opinions and disputes can be carried out through direct contact persons, e.g. diplomats. These direct relations are likely to strengthen and stabilize the overall scenario.
Second, mutual recognition between Croatia and Serbia+Montenegro has effects on the situation at large, especially on the continuing war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since the conflicting parties are intertwined, and Serbs live in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, a stabilisation process between Serbia and Croatia might reduce the conflicting parties' determination for war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Third, and most importantly, mutual recognition means that the peace process is no longer imposed by third parties through sanctions, embargos, etc., but is bom out of their own initiative. This does not prevent third parties from helping the recognizing States on their way to recognition, but the decisive act itself depends completely on the parties' own will and decisiveness. As history shows, a selfinitiated peace is a better guarantee for a lasting peace than an imposed one. Especially in a war like this, which has arisen out of ethnic conflicts between the different peoples of one State, and where there is not one single aggressor, the decisive initiative for peace must come from die involved parties themselves.
B. Relevant Changes since International Recognition
Having underlined the importance of mutual recognition as distinct from international'recognition, one has to ask whedier there have been any relevant changes in materia, i.e. concerning the conditions for recognition.
International recognition of Croatia took place in the first half of 1992. Since then, three years have passed. Consequently, one has to examine the effects of this lapse of time on the status of the republics, especially the status of the so-called 'Republika Srpska Krajina'. Three years ago, the Serbs in Croatia were recognized as a minority with all the rights accorded to minorities under public international law. We will see in a moment whether and in what respect the time factor has changed anything. Moreover, the reactions of the republics in question to the attitude of die international community and reactions of third States, may have contributed to a change in materia. The principles of estoppel and acquiescence, which constitute general principles under public international law, 20 show that certain reactions or conduct can have legal significance. 
IV. Recognition of Croatia by Belgrade
The recognition of Croatia as a sovereign State is closely connected with the status of Serbs in Croatia: Croatia wants first to be recognized before talking about possible autonomy for the Serbs in Croatia, while Belgrade wants to recognize Croatia only when an agreement regarding Serbian autonomy has been reached.
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Because of its political nature, recognition has often been made subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. 22 This practice can be justified by the fact that recognition is a unilateral Act of State, 23 the validity of which depends on the declaration and conduct of only one State.
Before turning to the effects of recognition on Croatia as a whole, I will examine the status of Serbs in Croatia.
A. Status of Serbs in Croatia
More than three years ago, the Badinter Committee was of the opinion, that 'the Serbian population in ... Croatia is entitled to all the rights concerned to minorities and ethnic groups under international law.' 24 Without explicitly denying the Serbian population's right to self-determination, the Committee put the stress on the Serbs' minority rights, thus trying to avoid a further break-up of the republics. Nevertheless, it derived these minority rights from the principle of the right to selfdetermination. This seems to be contradictory: either a minority has the right to selfdetermination which means that it does not constitute a minority any more, or it is denied this right in the interest of the integrity of States, and in order to hinder separatist activities. In this case, however, the rights accorded to minorities do not flow from the right to self-determination. Consequently, the Opinion of the Badinter Committee must be interpreted in such a way that the rights accorded to minorities imply certain rights of self-determination as, for example, to their language, religion and nationality.
The question arises whether the so-called 'Republika Srpska Krajina' still constitutes a minority after more than three years of control over the occupied territories and after permanent reference to statehood on their behalf. The Serbs cannot back up their claim to territorial sovereignty with the concept of effective occupation. Although relating to actual possession, effective occupation can only give a title if it is an occupation of terra nullius. 26 This is not the case with the Serbs in Yugoslavia. Originally belonging to the SFRY, the Serbian entities became part of Croatia following its independence (juti possidetis). So this land was at no time terra nullius.
The concept of acquisitive prescription, however, does not need the criterion of 'new' land. 'The essence of prescription is the removal of defects in a putative title arising from usurpation of another's sovereignty by the consent and acquiescence of the former sovereign.'
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The Serbs in Croatia have tried to publicly display State authority for more than three years, and have permanently used the term 'Republika Srpska Krajina'. Even if one takes the view that three years of possession -under special circumstances like the Yugoslav war, where demarcation lines and possession of territory change rather quickly, and where stabilisation is a major prospective -are already enough for persisting possession, the title of acquisitive prescription still lacks the element of acquiescence. Huber in the Palmas case refers to the 'continuous and peaceful display of State authority.'
28 Zagreb has always challenged the Serbian entities' statehood and, on the visit of Belgrade's Foreign Minister Jovanovic to Zagreb on 4 November 1994, Zagreb referred to the possibility of regaining control over the occupied territories with all -even military -means.
29 Therefore, the conditions for acquisitive prescription are not fulfilled because of lack of acquiescence. Neither the time factor, nor the conduct of the Serbs themselves and third parties (here the Croats), have led to the sovereignty of the Serbian entities in Croatia. They still (only) have the rights accorded to minorities under public international law.
Compared with the system for the protection of human rights, the protection of minority rights is still very insufficient and only in its inception. Moreover, it seems to be very difficult to agree internationally on a system of protection for minority rights. 30 The UN Charter contains a number of references to a general standard of non-discrimination. 31 Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966) 32 gives an even more precise and detailed definition of racial discrimination. But minorities not only need nondiscrimination but also special support and protection.
33 A further evolution in the system of minority rights can be seen in Article 27 of the UN Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (CCPR). According to that article, persons belonging to ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.
The negative formulation that individuals 'shall not be denied the right' indicates that direct, positive duties to guarantee rights absent from specific threats at the horizontal level cannot be inferred from Article 27 CCPR. 34 The obligation, however, goes beyond the mere prohibition of discrimination and contains elements of a right to de facto equality, i.e. positive protection against discrimination.
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On 18 December 1992, the General Assembly finally agreed on a Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.
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Although the Declaration's nine articles guarantee minority rights as to minorities' own culture, language and religion and provide for cooperation in national and regional political decisions, the Declaration suffers from a lack of binding effect. Moreover, it does not contain a definition of a 'minority' -such a definition has not yet been agreed upon, as shown by the European Council Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. This means that the definition of what constitutes a national minority is up to the States. Consequently, the scope of protection can be defined by each State in a different way. The Serbs in Croatia have already been recognized as minorities by the EC and other third countries. 37 The question of whether the Croats are willing to do so depends on how many rights they want to grant to the Serbs.
With the CCPR entering into force in Croatia on 8 October 1991, Croatia gave a report under Article 40(1 )(b) CCPR to the UN Committee on Human Rights at its 46th Meeting, from 19 October to 6 November 1992. 38 The report described measures that had been taken to prevent violations of human rights, e.g. the enactment of new laws concerning human rights and minority rights. The experts on the Committee acknowledged this, but still uttered their concerns about the abduction of Serbs, the lack of sanctions against members of armed forces who had violated human rights, and the conduct of Croatian troops on Bosnian territory. It is remarkable to note, however, that Croatia showed its willingness for an efficient protection of human rights and, especially, minority rights so promptly on the international level. Recent declarations on behalf of the Croats are in favour of efficient minority protection. 39 On the other hand, Croats still refer to the possibility of re-establishing 'law and order' in the Serbian-controlled areas.
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To fulfill the minimum standards of international law, Croatia would have to guarantee the Serbs' rights as to their own language, culture, religion and nationality. Moreover, the rule of non-discrimination entails equal political rights in national and regional decision-making.
In contrast to this, the so-called 'Republika Srpska Krajina' still wants to be a sovereign and independent State. As we have seen, this point of view lacks any legal basis under public international law. It is therefore important to formally place the Serbian entities under the Croatian government, and to guarantee far-ranging autonomy rights as to culture, education, media and economy. Even their desire for nationality does not contradict the fact that the Serbs formally belong to Croatia. It is difficult to imagine, however, that Serbs will be allowed their own currency and police. That would amount to a 'Serbian State within the State of Croatia', 41 which is against Croatia's legitimate interests. As the Declaration on Friendly Relations shows, the right to complete self-determination is only granted to oppressed peoples under totalitarian regimes. As long as the Serbs are granted the above-mentioned rights for minorities, they cannot refer to their sovereignty.
With the so-called 'Republika Srpska Krajina' being formally placed under the authority of the Croatian Government, the question of foreign relations basically remains with Zagreb. It is, then, up to the Serbs and Croats to find a solution that grants the Serbs in Croatia the establishment of external relations in the framework of their autonomy rights, e.g. the establishment of special relations with other minorities like the Bosnian Serbs or with other countries like Serbia. The question of foreign relations is part of the issue of legal personality in international law. 'International personality is participation, plus some form of community acceptance.' 42 Whether or not the entities have legal personality has to be considered in the light of the circumstances of the case, e.g. the reaction of other international persons. Here again, the Serbian entities in Croatia derive their rights from the Croatian Government. The recognition of Serbs as a minority in Croatia shows that their legal personality in international law only exists to the extent that is conceded to the Serbs by Zagreb.
B. Integrity of Croatian Territory
Mutual recognition of sovereign States comprises the duty to respect the territorial integrity of the other State. This principle was spelled out by the ICJ as early as The question arises, as to whether the influence of Belgrade on Serbian entities in Croatia contradicts the respect for Croatia's territorial integrity. Not only are there consultations between the Krajina-Serbs and Belgrade in all important questions, 44 Serbia has also established a military organisation and administration in the occupied areas. Apart from this political influence, there is great economic dependency on Serbia as arms, petrol and food are all supplied by Serbia. Whether this constitutes a breach of the duty to respect Croatia's territorial integrity depends on the nature and intensity of the acts. Whereas mere economic influence does not constitute such a breach, an administration organized and upheld by Belgrade is an 'exercice de sa puissance sur le territoire d'un autre Etat'. 45 If it is the case that the Krajina-Serbs are only being puppets in the hands of Belgrade, Croatia's integrity is violated and the Krajina-Serbs' plea for autonomy seems hypocritical.
The same result can be derived from the principle of non-intervention 46 or the duty of non-interference, 47 which is part of customary international law and founded upon the concept of respect for the territorial sovereignty of States. Whereas under classical doctrine only a 'dictatorial interference' 48 was forbidden, the 'Friendly Relations'-Declaration extended the scope of the principle in the sense that
[n]o State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.
This means that the duty of non-interference has received a wider applicability than the principle of territorial integrity. It even encompasses the supply of arms to certain persons of another State, who intend to use them against that State.
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Despite the armistice, agreed by Croats and Krajina-Serbs in March 1994, these arms may still be used against the Croats or against their interests, and therefore, the supply of arms to the Krajina-Serbs by Belgrade constitutes a breach of the duty of non-interference.
The question of massive violations of human rights committed by the Serbs in Croatia is also closely connected with the principle of non-interference and the respect for Croatia's territorial integrity. This problem has been repeatedly discussed by the UN Committee on Human Rights on the basis of human rights reports sent to the Committee by Serbia itself and reports from the Special Rapporteur on Yugoslavia, Tadeusz Mazowiecki. 50 It should be noted, however, that the duty to respect human rights exists independently from the recognition problem. I will therefore return to specific problems connected with the mutual recognition of both States.
A solution to the conflict between the integrity of Croatian territory and the influence of Belgrade on Serbian entities might be found in the establishment of a confederation between the Krajina-Serbs and their mother land. Such a plan has been suggested by M. Curry, the Speaker of the US Foreign Secretary, concerning the Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade. 51 A possible confederation between these parties might have a flow-on effect on the Serbian-Croatian scene. But is such a confederation compatible with a simultaneous recognition of the territorial integrity of Croatia (or Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it is suggested by the USA)?
The actual influence of Belgrade on Serbian entities conflicts -as we have seen -with Croatia's territorial integrity and constitutes a breach of the duty of noninterference where Croatia is recognized as a sovereign State by Belgrade. An eventual confederation between the Krajina-Serbs and Serbia would lead to an even more intense cooperation and the increased possibility of being influenced. In this case, the scope of recognition of Croatia as a sovereign State would have to be reduced. It would then only result in a recognition of the Croatian international frontiers without prejudice to the confederation. The relationship between Zagreb and Belgrade might thus become even more complicated and delicate. Moreover, this solution is to some extent contradictory: either Croatia could recognize the establishment of a Serbian confederation, but then the territorial sovereignty of Croatia over the Serbian entities would scarcely exist, or Serbia could recognize Croatia as a sovereign State without the possibility, under international law, of intervening,as regards Croatia's Serbian entities.
V. Recognition of Serbia and Montenegro by Zagreb
As we have seen above, Serbia and Montenegro have not been recognized internationally as the 'continuing State' of the former SFRY (Opinion No. 1 of the Badinter Committee). What is at stake here is not the question of Serbian statehood, but Serbia's demand to be recognized as the 'continuing State'. In contrast to territorial entitlement, the lapse of time has no influence on that situation. Either the essential organs of the SFRY continued to exist, leading to a continuity in statehood, or they did not. In the latter case, the passage of time cannot change this fact and the assessment of its legal consequences. However, the conduct of third States can give some insights regarding die international reception of this problem. 57 endorsed the Council's recommendation, it failed to expel the SFRY from the UN. Therefore the allegedly non-existent Yugoslavia continues to take its seat (with nameplate) in the General Assembly and the flag continues to fly in front of the UN compound. Its membership in the UN has only been suspended, despite all declarations that the SFRY has been dissolved. The question is whether Belgrade's wish to be recognized as 'continuing State' can be reduced to the wish to be recognized in any event. With recognition being a unilateral act, recognition itself and the wish to be recognized can be provided with conditions. In this case, one has to ask whether the annex 'continuing State' is so important for Serbia, that, without it, it would not have expressed any wish for recognition at all. As we have seen, Belgrade has never applied for recognition so that such a reduction is not possible.
A second argument against this reduction is that statehood cannot be enforced on States against their will.
58 States have to accept recognition in order to be able to establish diplomatic relations. These arguments are in conflict with the need and interest of certain States and, in particular, of Croatia, to have contacts with Belgrade. With recognition on both sides, a foundation for the establishment of diplomatic (and economic) relations would be laid. On the other hand, Zagreb's concern not to implicitly renounce all assets of the SFRY in case of Serbia being recognized is understandable too. This conflict can only be resolved if the question of recognition is separated from the question of continuity. The concept of mutual recognition should be envisaged and considered without prejudice to the question of whether Serbia and Montenegro is the 'continuing State' of the SFRY or not. 
VI. Conclusion
As the Yugoslavian crisis shows, recognition under public international law has developed from a purely formal point of view based on facts, to one based on political discretion and is -as such -becoming a tool for political action. Whereas, under classical doctrine it was only asked if the four criteria (see above) had been fulfilled, political realities are now taken into account. In the case of Croatia, the criterion of effective control over its territory has been interpreted in a wide sense, since Croatia does not have direct control over at least a third of its territory.
What effects does this development have on the mutual recognition between Zagreb and Belgrade? Recognition has become much more uncertain and unpredictable. This is a consequence of the above development which makes recognition subject to the political realities of each given case. The argument that this state of affairs leads to inconsistency 59 is overcome by the fact that the aim of recognition is to reach political agreement. Here, moral standards often play, if only implicitly, an important role, and an attempt to find a solution should not be content to consider only the mere facts of a war. The involved parties' major aim must be the establishment of direct relations in order to settle disputes peacefully. This conditions their mutual recognition. The extent to which they refer to moral standards in this process depends on their need and willingness to have direct talks with the other side. Both Croatia and Serbia need these direct relations as a first step. A second step will be the settlement of the disputes and the fulfilment of the conditions connected with the process of mutual recognition. 59 Rich, supra note 1, at 64;
